Michigan Law Review
Volume 60

Issue 7

1962

Labor Law--Federal Pre-Emption--State Jurisdiction to Prosecute
Labor Organizers for Criminal Trespass
John W. Galanis
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons,
and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John W. Galanis, Labor Law--Federal Pre-Emption--State Jurisdiction to Prosecute Labor Organizers for
Criminal Trespass, 60 MICH. L. REV. 1010 (1962).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol60/iss7/8

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1010

M1cHIGAN LAW

REvmw

[Vol. 60

LABOR LAW-FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION-STATE JuR1so1crxoN To PROSECUTE

LABOR ORGANIZERS FOR CRIMINAL TRESPASS-Defendants, non-employee
union organizers, entered the parking lot of a retail department store without permission for the sole purpose of distributing union material to the
store's employees. After continued refusal to comply with requests to leave,
the defendants were arrested, tried, and convicted of criminal trespass.1
It was contended that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the National Labor Relations Act2 had pre-empted state control of the labor
activities involved. On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, held, affirmed.
State jurisdiction was justified not only by the state's interest in domestic
peace and the protection of employer's property rights, but also by the
refusal of defendants to invoke the jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board. State v. Goduto, 21 Ill. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385 (1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961).
Since the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act much con•
troversy has ensued over the extent to which Congress intended to pre-empt
state jurisdiction over labor activities.3 Although the 1959 amendments to
the NLRA confer power upon state courts in suits which are declined by the
NLRB or which fail to meet NLRB jurisdictional lirnits,4 generally a state
cannot otherwise assert jurisdiction over labor activities which are arguably either prohibited or protected by the NLRA.6 This general rule applies even though a state judicial proceeding is founded upon legal theories
lying outside the realm of labor relations. 6 Any recognized exceptions to
1 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 565 (1957): "Whoever . . . is unlawfully upon the en•
closed land . . . of another and is notified to depart therefrom by the owner, or
occupant, or by his agent or servant, and neglects or refuses so to do • • . shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor . . . ."
2 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68
(1958).
3 See generally Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REv.
1297 (1954); Hays, Federalism and Labor Relations in the United States, 102 U. PA. L.
REv. 959 (1954); Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over
Labor Relations, 59 CoLuM. L. REY. 6 (1959).
4 Landrum-Griffin Act § 701, 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (Supp . I, 1959).
See generally Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act, 44 MINN. L. R.Ev. 257 (1959); Smith, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 46 VA. L. REY. 195 (1960).
G See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959), and
authorities cited therein.
6 In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, supra note 5, at 244, the Court
stated: "Nor has it mattered whether the States have acted through laws of broad general
application rather than laws specifically directed toward the governance of industrial
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the expressed federal pre-emption doctrine are attributable to a conflict
between national and state interests and to the interaction between the
exercise of federal and state powers.7 The United States Supreme Court, in
balancing the national and state interests, has consistently recognized an
overriding state interest in the control of violence in labor disputes by
permitting states to enjoin such conduct8 or to grant tort damage recovery. 9
Whether a state may also enjoin a trespass incident to a labor dispute has
never specifically been decided, although that question was presented to
the Supreme Court in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, lnc. 10
There the Court expressly reserved the question and rejected the assertion
of state jurisdiction on other grounds.11 Thus the court in the principal
case felt that it was not precluded from upholding the state's prosecution
of defendants' solicitation on company premises, notwithstanding the fact
that this activity was arguably protected under the NLRA. 12 Since no
remedies were available to the employer under the NLRA,13 the court also
reasoned that application of the federal pre-emption doctrine would endanger domestic peace in that it would force the employer to resort to selfrelations. Regardless of the mode adopted, to allow States to control conduct which is
the subject of national regulation would create potential frustration of national purposes." (Emphasis added.)
See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 152 (1960).
See, e.g., Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (state court enjoined threatened
violence in picketing); Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United Elec. Workers v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942) (state court enjoined violence). For a
collection of state decisions granting injunctions, see Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 1026 (1953).
9 See, e.g., UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (recovery allowed non-striking employee where entry was blocked by mass picketing). In United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954), tort recovery was allowed against a union
that forced the employer to abandon several construction projects. See also San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (state jurisdiction to award tort
damages denied since no violence present).
10 353 U.S. 20 (1957) (state court enjoined picketing, trespassing, and exerting secondary pressures on suppliers). Accord, State v. Williams, 37 CCH Lab. Cas. 67,515
(Md. Crim. Ct., Baltimore City 1959) (trespass jurisdiction denied).
11 Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., supra note 10, at 24.
12 Section 7 of the NLRA, which guarantees employees the right of self-organization,
has been interpreted to include solicitation by non-employees on company premises when
it can be shown that there is no reasonable alternative means of communication with
employees or that a valid no-solicitation rule is being unfairly applied. See National
Labor Relations Act § 7, as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958); NLRB
v. Babcock &: Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956). See generally Hanley, Union Organization on Company Property-A Discussion of Property Rights, 47 GEO. L.J. 266 (1958).
13 Under the NLRA, there are no rights granted to the employer to cover this activity. See National Labor Relations Act § 8, as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (1958). Also, since there are no declaratory judgment procedures available, a
complaint charging an unfair labor practice must be filed to seek NLRB determination
of the rights of the parties. This would not help the employer since in effect it would
require the employer to charge himself with having committed an unfair labor practice.
Sec 29 C.F.R. § 101.2 (Supp. 1961). Cf. Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union, 363 P.2d 803
(Wash. 1961).
7
8
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help devices.14 In contrast, the defendants could have protected their statutory rights by invoking the jurisdiction of the NLRB for a proper adjudication.15 These considerations might seem to justify the court's assertion of
jurisdiction to protect the employer's property rights.16
No authority, however, supports such an extension of state remedies
in this area of federal pre-emption.17 The absence of previous instances
of state criminal prosecution in this area is possibly attributable to the
accessibility of NLRB protection for union solicitors who have been unlawfully restrained or prohibited.18 In any event, no court has had to
face the precise considerations which led this court to assume jurisdiction.
A conspicuous absence of criminal prosecution also exists with respect
to the so-called "violence" cases, where state relief has usually been entirely injunctive in nature.19 This may be due to the lack of state legislation adapted to meet particular problems of labor violence,20 thereby
necessitating the use of the more flexible injunction. The "violence"
cases, by analogy, might tend to support the use of state injunctive powers
in trespass situations.21 Furthermore, if the state should resolve to act in
these situations, it is apparent that the use of its injunctive powers offers
a more suitable compromise of the interests involved than does a resort
14 The principal case may represent a rounding out of the "violence" requirement
as to the degree of violence necessary before states can exercise jurisdiction over labor
activities falling within the NLRA. In this connection see De Veau v. Braisted, 363
U.S. 144 (1960), 59 M1cH. L. REv. 643 (1961).
15 A complaint charging an unfair labor practice could have been submitted to the
NLRB which would have resulted in a subsequent "cease-and-desist" order if the defendant's right had been violated. See, e.g., Marshall Field 8e Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d
375 (7th Cir. 1952).
16 Apparently the defendants' refusal to invoke the jurisdiction of the NLRB was
the decisive factor in persuading the court to assert jurisdiction. Principal case at 614,
174 N.E.2d at 389, "We are unwilling to hold that the State courts are divested of
jurisdiction, not because Congress has preempted the area, but because of the course
the union organizers have followed."
17 A search of the authorities suggests this application of a criminal trespass statute
in the area of pre-emption is sui generis. Cf. People v. Mazo, 38 CCH Lab. Cas. 68,000
(Ill. Cir. Ct., Whiteside County 1959), where the court stated that a criminal trespass
suit for peaceful picketing could be maintained because preservation of property rights
is a "compelling state interest" comparable to protection from violence.
18 See cases collected in Hanley, Union Organization on Company Property-A
Discussion of Property Rights, 47 GEo. L.J. 266 (1958).
19 No case authority was found which applied criminal prosecution to labor activities falling within the coverage of the NLRA.
20 Some states have criminal laws directed at the type of violence which may arise
out of labor disputes. But for the most part, state control of labor violence rests with
common-law offenses such as assault, breach of peace, unlawful assembly and affray.
See Brown, State Legislative Protection from Labor Violence and Coercion, 4 LAB. L.J.
822 (1953); Note, 67 YALE L.J. 325 (1957).
21 But see Retail Clerks v. Your Food Stores, Inc., 225 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1955), in
which an injunction issued by a state court based upon the state law of trespass and
directed against peaceful picketing was set aside because of federal pre-emption.
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to criminal sanctions.22 Whereas the Illinois court, because of the "primary competence" of the NLRB,23 declined to decide whether the defendants' trespass was justified under the NLRA, an injunction would leave
defendants free to seek NLRB protection.24 Consequently, an injunction
would not only protect the employer's property rights, but would enable
union solicitors to invoke the jurisdiction of the NLRB. On the other
hand, since the "primary competence" of the NLRB precludes a state
court from determining if the defendants were within their rights granted
by the NLRA, the enforcement of a criminal trespass statute would force
the defendants to seek United States Supreme Court review in order to
obtain relief from state criminal penalties. Such extensive litigation seems
a high price for union organizers to pay for failing to seek NLRB determination of their statutory rights. Moreover, potential use of criminal
trespass prosecutions to imprison25 union organizers might tend to discourage legitimate union solicitation on company property contrary to
the purposes and objectives of the NLRA and, as such, would not seem
to be desirable as an allowable employer weapon.
In spite of the distinct advantages involved in the use of injunctive
relief when compared with criminal prosecution of union activity resulting in a non-violent trespass, to grant states the power to enjoin such a
trespass as a singular exception to the pre-emption doctrine seems too narrow a position to be acceptable. No authority supports any such piecemeal grant of state jurisdiction, and such a position would place states
in the anomalous situation of having the power to enjoin the labor union
trespass without having the power to entertain suits for tort or criminal
violations that may arise for the same conduct. A critical view of the
purported threat of violence which the Illinois court relied on in reaching
22 The Illinois anti-injunction statute has been interpreted not to apply to unlawful
acts incident to labor disputes and thereby would not preclude state injunctive powers.
See Bitzer Motor Co. v. Local 604, Teamsters Union, 349 Ill. App. 283, 110 N.E.2d 674
(1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 2(a) (Smith-Hurd 1950). See also Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d
323 (1953).
23 Principal case at 613, 174 N.E.2d at 389. See also NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
24 The NLRB has power upon issuance of an unfair labor practice complaint to
petition a federal district court for appropriate temporary relief or a restraining order.
Labor-Management Relations Act § l0(j), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1958).
See Capital Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954) (federal district court has power
to restrain enforcement of a state injunction at the instance of the NLRB). But see
Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Brothers Co., 348 U.S. 511 (1955) (a federal
district court has no jurisdiction to restrain state injunction at the instance of a private
party).
25 As a result of the recent sit-in demonstrations, many of the Southern states have
added imprisonment penalties to their criminal trespass statutes. See, e.g., MISS. CoDE
ANN. § 2409.07 (Supp. 1960), which imposes a fine of not more than $500 or confinement in the county jail for a period not exceeding six months or both for a conviction
of criminal trespass.
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its decision suggests that the possibility of actual violence in these situations is in reality not a very great one. In most situations, the employer
normally will have suitable passive physical means available such as fences,
for example, to prevent union solicitation on his property. Thus, the
better solution in the ordinary trespass situations would seem to be achieved
through a strict application of the expressed pre-emption doctrine that all
non-violent labor activity which is arguably protected by the NLRA is
federally pre-empted. Otherwise, granting of jurisdiction to the states
would in effect be subjecting non-violent union conduct to state jurisdiction simply because it violates a state criminal statute. Logically, if state
courts are pre-empted when the union activity is arguably protected or
prohibited by the NLRA in civil suits when violence is not present, the
same result should follow when non-violent union activity violates state
criminal statutes. While a conceptual distinction could be made between
union conduct which violates state civil law and that violating state criminal laws, since states could pass criminal statutes which cover numerous
labor activities, this distinction would potentially result in a considerable
expansion of state jurisdiction over labor activities that fall within the
provisions of the NLRA. Such a result would serve to thwart the policy
of national uniformity in labor relations expressed and exemplified by the
NLRA.
Admittedly the employer's position in the principal case is a difficult
one because of the defendants' refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the
NLRB.26 However, there will always be cases which occasionally present
special problems in the grey area between pre-emption and state jurisdiction wherever the line is finally drawn. Nevertheless, a line must certainly
be drawn. Therefore, in trespass situations, the better approach would
seemingly lie in a consistent application of the pre-emption doctrine unless
a sufficient quantum of violence is present which will permit states to bring
themselves within the valid and recognized "violence" exception. Such a
quantum should indicate more than a mere possibility but rather an imminent endangering of the public peace, determinable judicially on an
ad hoc basis from the particular facts and circumstances of each situation.

John W. Galanis
26 Perhaps the presence of other reasonable methods of communicating with employees explains the defendants' refusal to invoke the jurisdiction of the NLRB. For
a good discussion of the factors considered in determining "other reasonable alternatives," see Hanley, Union Organization on Company Property-A Discussion of Property
Rights, 47 GEo. L.J. 266, 288 (1958).

